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Evaluating Financial Health of Credit Cooperatives in Maharashtra of India  
 
 
Deepak Shah* 
 
Context: 
Among various states of India, the Rural Financial Institutions (RFIs) of Maharashtra 
are reported to show the highest amount of overdues and outstanding loans over the past one 
decade (Gulati and Bathla, 2002). Even the proportion of overdues to outstanding loan of RFIs 
are substantially high in this state. One of the earlier studies conducted in cooperative sector of 
Maharashtra has clearly shown better financial health for the institutions at the district level as 
compared to the primary or grass root level (Shah, 2001). It is not the cooperatives alone but 
there are several RFIs that are beset with similar plethora of deficiencies that impede their 
efficient functioning. This necessitates a relook at the performance of various agricultural 
financial institutions operating in Maharashtra with a view to recommending, designing and 
framing appropriate policies to rejuvenate the existing rural credit delivery in this state. 
The major foci of attention of this paper are on not only to review the rural credit 
scenario of Maharashtra but also to examine the banking business, in general, and disparity in 
distribution of credit, in particular, in both forward and backward regions/districts of 
Maharashtra. The scope of the study stretches further to the evaluation of issues related to 
viability of these agricultural financial institutions operating in these regions/districts of the 
state, especially in the era of financial sector reforms.  
 The entire paper is divided into two sections. While the first section 
specifically focuses on the evaluation of credit delivery in forward and backward 
districts of Maharashtra, the second section is chiefly devoted to examining the 
functioning of various RFIs in the state.  
Section I 
Banking Business in Forward and Backward Districts 
The composition of banking network in the forward district of Sangli of Maharashtra 
of India encompasses 15 nationalised banks, four scheduled commercial banks, Maharashtra 
State Finance Corporation (M.S.F.C.), Sangli District Central Cooperative Bank  (SDCCB), 
and Maharashtra State Cooperative Rural Development Bank (MSCARDB). Among these, the 
SDCCB has the largest network of rural branches and plays a pivotal role in implementing the 
District Credit Plan (DCP) as well as in distributing rural credit. The implementation of DCP 
and the performance achieved under it are regularly monitored in the Block Level Bankers 
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Committee (B.L.B.C.) meetings at the block level as well as in the District Level Consultative 
Committee (D.L.C.C.) meetings at the district level. Periodic review of performance achieved 
under DCP helps in bringing on surface the strengths and weaknesses of various programmes 
relating to socio-economic development. Due to the concerted efforts of the members of 
D.L.C.C, the banking business of this district has flourished significantly over time.  
As for the backward district of Buldana of Maharashtra of India, the banking network 
encompasses a group of four public sector banks, two banks relating to State Bank group, two 
cooperative banks, two Gramin banks, and M.S.F.C. However, in general, these banks are 
broadly classified as commercial and cooperative banks. 
In general, the development of banking business in Sangli and Buldana districts has 
been evaluated in terms of growth trends in credit in relation to deposits and also in terms of 
targets achieved by various banks under DCP during the period between 1989-90 and 1998-99, 
and these estimates for commercial and cooperative banks, are brought out in Table 1.  
A critical evaluation of Table 1 shows dwindling of credit-deposit ratio of commercial 
banks in the forward district of Sangli , which has fallen even below 60 per cent in 1997-98. 
Like commercial banks, the cooperative banks in this district have also shown a declining C-D 
ratio during the decade of 1990s. Nonetheless, it is to be noted that this C-D ratio for 
cooperative banks remained well above 100 per cent all through the period between 1989-90 
and 1997-98. During the given period of time, the SDCCB has shown lower C-D ratio as 
compared to cooperative banks in general operating in this district.  
The commercial banks operating in backward district of Buldana have also shown a 
falling C-D ratio all through the decade of 1990s. The C-D ratios of commercial banks of this 
district have fallen from 88 per cent in 1989-90 to 61 per cent by 1998-99. The cooperative 
banks operating in this district have also followed a trend similar to commercial banks and 
have shown their C-D ratio to fall from as high as 130 per cent in 1992-93 to nearly 100 per 
cent by 1998-99. The C-D ratio of BDCCB is seen to be much lower than the overall C-D ratio 
of cooperative banks operating in this district. The higher C-D ratios of cooperative banks are 
mainly due to their higher amount of loan advances as compared to their deposits. 
It is also clearly evident from Table 1 that, during the period between 1990-91 and 
1996-97, the commercial banks operating in Sangli district have not only achieved their targets 
of loan advances set for agriculture and allied activities but also for other priority sectors. 
Similarly, the cooperative banks operating in this district are also seen to achieve their targets 
of loan advances set for agriculture and allied. However, the performance of commercial banks 
in terms of achieving their targets of loan advances to various sectors is much better as 
compared to cooperative banks operating in this district.  
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Table 1: Key Indicators of Development of Banking Business in Sangli and Buldana Districts 
(C-D ratio in per cent) 
Forward District: Sangli  Backward District: Buldana 
Achievement as % of Target Achievement as % of Target Year C-D 
Ratio  Agril. & Allied  SSI OPS Total 
C-D 
Ratio  Agril. & Allied  SSI OPS Total 
Commercial Banks 
1989-90 67.95     88.22 - - - - 
1990-91 71.59 135.52 85.70 173.30 139.67 78.05 - - - - 
1991-92 68.65 106.99 178.96 78.28 109.02 75.81 90.46 26.68 85.94 84.66 
1992-93 65.70 92.03 197.03 105.43 103.96 75.64 98.45 89.72 71.99 92.78 
1993-94 55.47 131.61 102.73 140.63 128.04 65.68 120.52 27.73 95.96 108.28 
1994-95 61.23 129.81 166.16 173.98 145.15 63.11 137.39 47.84 175.51 132.74 
1995-96 66.51 122.61 71.84 112.44 110.82 59.81 110.64 5.62 165.23 99.73 
1996-97 61.20 107.46 66.90 109.61 100.10 63.18 89.14 28.28 59.62 77.74 
1997-98 54.21 - - - - 65.48 101.57 39.89 71.83 90.74 
1998-99 - - - - - 61.13 102.26 87.18 100.53 100.82 
Cooperative Banks @ 
1989-90 127.20 
(85.93) 
- - - - 122.98 
(100.83) 
- - - - 
1990-91 169.79 
(121.39) 
106.75 91.57 109.68 105.47 113.68 
(88.90) 
- - - - 
1991-92 145.33 
(145.33) 
106.77 65.94 169.10 112.97 130.58 
(103.71) 
100.93 98.42 151.84 102.18 
1992-93 202.56 
(155.71) 
120.35 193.96 77.54 122.24 118.53 
(91.99) 
90.78 43.48 14.40 79.63 
1993-94 157.86 
(119.98) 
125.29 130.31 109.99 125.34 113.95 
(91.60) 
115.27 25.34 2.99 94.73 
1994-95 203.42 
(169.39) 
121.67 205.78 70.25 127.01 104.95 
(84.13) 
119.58 104.78 22.09 115.10 
1995-96 171.99 
(143.54) 
90.89 104.35 52.58 90.81 100.29 
(82.26) 
99.57 472.49 84.84 126.69 
1996-97 143.07 
(123.29) 
75.94 85.25 82.86 76.63 92.91 
(77.88) 
84.30 93.44 15.41 83.35 
1997-98 134.04 
(106.22) 
- - - - 127.47 
(109.85) 
79.46 33.49 10.60 63.51 
1998-99 - - - - - 99.49 
(89.14) 
85.79 112.28 169.80 106.38 
Grand Total 
1989-90 84.91 - - - - 99.45 - - - - 
1990-91 98.37 114.90 89.33 145.61 117.14 88.99 - - - - 
1991-92 89.75 106.83 101.43 137.29 111.78 94.37 96.86 66.20 97.10 94.56 
1992-93 103.77 113.04 195.47 99.89 116.38 90.40 93.70 57.22 57.66 84.94 
1993-94 86.51 126.59 118.59 132.08 126.05 81.94 117.26 25.98 62.95 100.04 
1994-95 105.25 123.30 187.48 149.80 131.86 78.36 127.16 74.14 144.80 123.38 
1995-96 103.11 97.26 86.65 100.34 96.49 74.77 103.83 139.19 157.26 113.77 
1996-97 90.70 82.27 74.52 104.57 83.54 75.22 86.58 53.82 55.87 80.35 
1997-98 79.57 75.03 46.60   71.10 71.96 86.77 88.97 37.17 16.85 73.20 
1998-99 - - - - - 77.26 93.17 94.19 147.22 104.17 
Source: Figures have been compiled from ‘District Credit Plan (Various Years) Under   
             Service Area Approach’, Districts: Sangli and Buldana, Maharashtra. 
Notes: @-including loan advances of LDBs and Maharashtra State Finance Corporation (MSFC) 
            1) Figures in parentheses are C-D ratios for SDCCB Ltd and BDCCB Ltd., respectively. 
  2) For Sangli District: Commercial Banks include State Bank of India (SBI), Bank of Baroda (BOB), Bank of 
Maharashtra (BOM), Canara Bank (CB), Central Bank of India (CBI), Corporation Bank (CB), Dena Bank 
(DB), Indian Bank (IB), Punjab National Bank (PNB), Punjab and Sind Bank (PSB), Syndicate Bank (SB), 
UCO Bank, Union Bank of India (UBI), Vijya Bank (VB), Sangli Bank Ltd. (SB Ltd.), United Western Bank 
(UWB), Ratnakar Bank Ltd. (RB Ltd.), Bank of India (BOI).  Cooperative Banks include Sangli District 
Central Cooperative Bank (SDCCB), Maharashtra State Cooperative Rural Development Bank (MSCARDB), 
and Maharashtra State Finance Corporation (MSFC). 
3) For Buldana District: Commercial Banks include State Bank of India (SBI), Bank of Baroda (BOB), Bank 
of Maharashtra (BOM), Central Bank of India (CBI), Punjab National Bank (PNB), State Bank of Hyderabad 
(SBH), Buldana Gramin Bank (BGB), and United Western Bank (UWB). Cooperative Banks include Buldana 
District Central Cooperative Bank (BDCCB), Lead Development Banks (LDBs), and Maharashtra State 
Finance Corporation (MSFC). 
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Interestingly, neither the commercial nor the cooperative banks have achieved the targets 
of loan advances set for S.S.Is, especially during 1995-96 and 1996-97. As a result, the overall 
targets of loan advances achieved by commercial and cooperative banks have fallen close to 100 
per cent during these years. As for the achievement of targets of loan advances under DCP, both 
commercial and cooperative banks, in general, are seen to show better performance during the 
period between 1990-91 and 1994-95 and thereafter a deterioration in their performance in this 
respect is seen. 
An analysis drawn from Table 1 also shows better performance of commercial banks 
operating in Buldana district as for the achievements of their targets of loan advances to 
agriculture and allied activities are concerned. Cooperative banks in this district are seen to 
have performed well as far as the achievements of their targets of loan advances to S.S.Is. and 
other priority sectors are concerned. However, mention may be made here that the overall 
performance of cooperative banks in Buldana district in terms of achieving their targets of loan 
advances to various sectors is much better as against the commercial banks. Not only the 
cooperative banks have shown better performance in terms of achieving their targets of loan 
advances under DCP but also in respect of C-D ratio, which is seen to have been higher than 
commercial banks and in accordance with the norms stipulated by the RBI. 
It is to be further noted that the loan advances of commercial banks to priority sectors 
in Sangli district remained well above 40 per cent of their total loan advances during the 
period between 1991-92 and 1996-97 (Table 2). Similarly, during the same period, the direct 
advances of commercial banks to agriculture also remained above 18 per cent of their total 
loan advances as stipulated by the RBI. Except for the year 1996-97, the advances of 
commercial banks to weaker sections also remained above 10 per cent as stipulated by the 
RBI. Nonetheless, the disquieting feature of Table 2 is the loan advances of commercial banks 
under DRI schemes, which is seen to have remained less than 1 per cent of their total loan 
advances all through the period between 1991-92 and 1996-97. On the hand, the cooperative 
banks in this district have shown relatively better performance insofar as their loan advances to 
priority sectors and loan advances to weaker sections are concerned.  
The cooperative banks operating in this district have strictly followed the minimum 
prescribed limits of the RBI. Table 2 also shows a steady increase in loan advances of 
commercial banks to non priority sectors. Contrary to this, the loan advances of cooperative 
banks to these sectors have come down in course of time. 
Thus, the estimates relating to banking business presented in Tables 1 and 2 reveal 
much better performance of cooperative banks during the decade of 1990s. The cooperative 
banks have performed well not only in forward district of Sangli but also in Backward district 
of Buldana. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Loan Advances to Various Sectors/Purposes in Sangli District 
(Amount in Lakh Rupees) 
Percentage to Total Loan Advances Banks/Years Loan Advances PS Advances DA Advances WS Advances DRI Advances NPS Advances 
Commercial Banks 
1991-92 22190.03 55.52 31.29 14.65 0.62 44.48 
1992-93 24575.89 51.49 29.06 14.38 0.43 48.51 
1993-94 25021.86 53.63 28.21 14.69 0.49 46.37 
1994-95 30737.57 48.71 25.07 10.96 0.43 51.29 
1995-96 37239.73 46.36 24.18 11.11 0.71 53.64 
1996-97 39075.64 46.58 24.03 8.14 0.68 53.42 
Cooperative Banks 
1991-92 17830.13 44.31 - 1.15 - 55.69 
1992-93 29191.94 55.23 44.86 6.29 - 44.77 
1993-94 30975.00 60.45 49.67 16.08 - 39.55 
1994-95 45793.73 49.37 40.41 15.09 - 50.63 
1995-96 51164.57 49.20 41.47 16.58 - 50.80 
1996-97 51854.24 53.36 41.09 16.01 - 46.64 
Grand Total 
1991-92 40020.16 50.52 17.35 8.37 0.35 49.48 
1992-93 53767.83 53.52 37.64 9.99 0.20 46.48 
1993-94 55996.86 57.40 40.08 15.46 0.22 42.60 
1994-95 76531.30 49.11 34.25 13.43 0.17 50.89 
1995-96 88404.30 48.00 34.19 14.28 0.30 52.00 
1996-97 90929.88 50.44 33.76 12.63 0.29 49.56 
Source: As in Table 9. 
Notes: 1) PS = Priority Sector; DA = Direct Agriculture; WS = Weaker Sections 
                DRI = Differential Rate of Interest Schemes; NPS = Non Priority Sector 
 2) RBI has stipulated minimum levels as follows: (i) Advances to priority sector – 40 % of   
total advances, (ii) Advances to agriculture – 18 % of total advances, (iii) Advances to weaker   
sections – 10 % of total advances, (iv) Advances under DRI schemes – 1 % per cent of total  
advances, and (v) Credit/Deposit ratio – a minimum of 60 %. 
 
The credit delivery and recovery performance of cooperative banks are noticed to be 
remarkable in the forward district of Sangli. Nonetheless, as for the achievements of targets of 
loan advances to various sectors, the commercial banks of Sangli district have performed 
better than cooperative banks operating in this district. At the same time, it deserves mention 
here that both commercial and cooperative banks have shown rather poor performance insofar 
as their achievements of targets of loan advances to S.S.Is are concerned. This holds good in 
both the forward district of Sangli and the backward district of Buldana.  Shrinking flow of 
credit to S.S.Is during the decade of 1990s is certainly a matter of concern. 
Institutional Viability 
 The focus of the present study is on assessing viability of only central level credit 
institutions operating in both forward district of Sangli and backward district of Buldana. 
These central level credit institutions are: Sangli District Central Cooperative Bank (SDCCB) 
and Buldana District Central Cooperative Bank (BDCCB). The viability of these credit 
institutions is evaluated with the help of estimation of break-even levels of their total loan 
advances and deposits, and also through estimation of various financial ratios, particularly for 
the period between 1984-85 and 1998-99. 
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Break-even Analysis   
 The estimates on the variable cost incurred and income generated in respect of per 
hundred rupee of money spent on advances coupled with break-even points of loan advances 
and deposits for SDCCB and BDCCB encompassing the period between 1984-85 and 198-99 
are provided in Table 3. 
The estimates provided in Table 3 show that the SDCCB granted 12.62 per cent higher 
loan than the break-even level during TE 1986-87, 26.59 per cent during TE 1992-93, and 5.88 
per cent during TE 1998-99. A similar trend was also noticed in respect of break-even level of 
deposits and actual deposit of the bank. The actual deposit of SDCCB turned out to be 23.38 
per cent higher than the estimated break-even level during TE 1986-87, 26.66 per cent during 
TE 1992-93 and 5.94 per cent during TE 1998-99. Thus, the financial viability of SDCCB had 
declined during TE 1998-99 as against TE 1986-87 and TE 1992-93 consequent to break-even 
levels of both advances and deposits becoming very close to actual advances and deposits 
during the late nineties as compared to mid-eighties and the early nineties. 
Table 3: Break Even Levels of Advances and Deposits for SDCCB and BDCCB 
 
% Change Particulars TE 1986-87 (1) 
TE 1992-93 
(2) 
TE 1998-99 
(3) 2 over I 3 over 2 3 over 1 
SDCCB       
1. Income per Hundred Rupee Advance (Rs.) 22.30 20.68 28.02 -7.26 35.49 25.65 
2. Variable Cost per Hundred Rupee 
Advance (Rs.) 
18.15 16.73 23.85 -7.82 42.56 31.40 
3. Margin per Hundred Rupee Advance 4.15 3.95 4.17 -4.82 5.56 0.48 
4. Fixed Expenses (Lakh Rs.) 229.95 623.93 1838.98 171.33 194.74 699.73 
5. Break Even Point (BEP) for Advance 5547.22 15762.55 44066.35 184.15 179.56 694.39 
6. Break Even Point (BEP) for Deposit 7072.94 15470.99 51222.94 118.73 231.09 624.21 
7. Actual Advance (Lakh Rs.) 6247.02 19953.40 46656.68 219.41 133.83 646.86 
8. Actual Deposit (Lakh Rs.) 7948.62 19595.55 54265.89 146.53 176.93 582.71 
9. Percentage of Actual Advance to BEP 112.62 126.59 105.88 13.97 -20.65 -6.74 
10. Percentage of Actual Deposit to BEP 112.38 126.66 105.94 14.28 -20.72 -6.44 
11. Percentage of BEP to Actual Advance 88.80 78.99 94.45 - - - 
12. Percentage of BEP to Actual Deposit 88.98 78.95 94.39 - - - 
BDCCB       
1. Income per Hundred Rupee Advance (Rs.) 16.21 18.17 23.00 12.09 26.58 41.88 
2. Variable Cost per Hundred Rupee 
Advance (Rs.) 
11.38 12.60 17.15 10.72 36.11 50.70 
3. Margin per Hundred Rupee Advance 4.83 5.57 5.85 15.32 5.03 21.12 
4. Fixed Expenses (Lakh Rs.) 131.74 283.76 2308.37 115.39 713.49 1652.22 
5. Break Even Point (BEP) for Advance 2739.93 5105.54 39200.95 86.34 667.81 1330.73 
6. Break Even Point (BEP) for Deposit 1973.44 5197.12 49568.28 163.35 853.76 2411.77 
7. Actual Advance (Lakh Rs.) 2984.78 5344.31 15716.78 79.05 194.08 426.56 
8. Actual Deposit (Lakh Rs.) 2156.30 5443.78 19998.49 152.46 267.36 827.44 
9. Percentage of Actual Advance to BEP 108.94 104.68 40.09 -4.26 -64.59 -68.85 
10. Percentage of Actual Deposit to BEP 109.27 104.75 40.34 -4.52 -64.41 -68.93 
11. Percentage of BEP to Actual Advance 91.80 95.53 249.42 - - - 
12. Percentage of BEP to Actual Deposit 91.52 95.47 247.86 - - - 
 
 As for the BDCCB, The break-even level of loan advances was estimated at 
Rs.2739.93 lakhs in TE 1986-87, Rs.5105.54 lakhs in TE 1992-93, and Rs.39200.95 lakhs in 
TE 1998-99. As against this, the actual loan advances of this bank were Rs.2984.79 lakhs in 
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TE 1986-87, Rs.5344.31 lakhs in TE 1992-93, and Rs.15716.78 lakhs in TE 1998-99. Thus, 
the bank granted 8.94 per cent higher loan than the break-even level during TE 1986-87 and 
4.68 per cent during TE 1992-93. However, during TE 1998-99, the actual loan advance of 
BDCCB was much lower than the breakeven level and a deficit in this loan to the tune of 
around 60 per cent was noticed during this period. A similar trend was also noticed in respect 
of break-even level of deposits and the actual deposit of the bank. The actual deposit of 
BDCCB turned out to be 9.27 per cent higher than the estimated break-even level during TE 
1986-87 and 5.23 per cent during TE 199293 with a deficit in this deposit estimated at 60 per 
cent during TE 1998-99. 
Ratio Analysis 
Five different categories of ratios have been estimated with a view to analyze the 
operational and functional efficiency of SDCCB and BDCCB and these ratios for the three 
time periods under consideration are brought out in Table 4. 
 A critical evaluation of Table 4 revealed that though the financial health of SDCCB 
had improved during the second half as against the former half of the overall period 
considered, the more recent period, i.e. the late nineties period, was found to be marked with 
declining profitability ratios, fixed ratio, asset turnover ratio, income-expenditure ratio, 
equalization and income multiplier, and marginal efficiency of capital of SDCCB. Although 
the capitalization ratio of SDCCB gave an indication that the permanent capital of this 
financial institution had increased over time, this increase in permanent capital of SDCCB, 
however, might not be considered as a sign of improvement in its efficiency since major 
portion of SDCCB’s assets were financed by debt and this dependency on debt had marginally 
increased during the latter half as against the former half of the overall period. Further, hardly 
any improvement in the net worth of SDCCB was observed and in fact the share of net worth 
in total liability of SDCCB had rather declined over time. 
The declining share of net worth was instrumental in causing an increase in debt asset 
ratio of SDCCB during the latter period. This apart, the return on owner’s equity had also 
drastically fallen during the late nineties period as against the early nineties. Thus, it could be 
interpreted that the financial health and economic viability of SDCCB had considerably 
declined in more recent times, ignoring increasing trends in several financial ratios. In fact, the 
return on owner’s equity is a function of how efficiently a firm manages its assets, the net 
profit margin on sales, and the degree of financial leverage. A decline in returns on equity of 
SDCCB could, therefore, be considered as a sign of decline in the efficiency of SDCCB in 
managing its assets and liabilities, and also income and expenditure pattern, especially in more 
recent times.  
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Table 4: Financial Ratio Analysis for SDCCB and BDCCB 
Financial Ratios SDCCB BDCCB 
 TE 
1986-87 
TE 
1992-93 
TE 
1998-99 
TE 
1986-87 
TE 
1992-93 
TE 
1998-99 
A. Liquidity Ratios       
     a. Current Ratio 1.40 1.45 1.73 1.13 1.18 1.14 
     b. Acid Test Ratio 1.06 0.85 1.05 0.98 1.10 1.48 
B. Profitability Ratios       
     a. Rate of Return on Asset (%) 0.27 0.58 0.15 0.24 0.13 -4.37 
     b. Return on Owner’s Equity 3.74 7.47 2.10 2.67 1.62 -67.77 
C. Financial Leverage Ratios       
     a. Debt-Asset Ratio  (%) 92.67 93.28 93.16 91.13 91.81 93.00 
     b. Capitalization Ratio (%) 87.55 87.83 89.84 0.73 0.81 0.86 
     c. Fixed Ratio 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.64 0.56 0.55 
     d. Net Capital Ratio 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.10 1.09 1.08 
     e. Equity Ratio 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.08 
     f. Equity to Asset Value Ratio 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 
D. Efficiency Ratios       
      a. Asset Turnover (times) 0.62 0.71 0.66 0.55 0.52 0.55 
      b. Accounts Receivable Turnover (times) 16.11 10.25 19.87 12.80 8.66 5.71 
      c. Days Advances Outstanding (days) 22.72 37.44 18.62 28.62 42.85 67.73 
E. Income Ratios       
      a. Income-Expenditure Ratio (%) 101.96 104.27 100.78 102.75 101.37 81.66 
      b. Gross Ratio (%) 98.09 95.91 99.20 97.35 98.65 131.86 
      c. Operating Ratio (%) 79.16 77.72 84.03 64.58 64.95 69.00 
      d. Rate of Capital Turnover 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.13 
F. Other Diagnostic Tools / Ratios        
       a. Equalization Multiplier  - 49.02 36.01 - 22.45 34.50 
       b. Income Multiplier - 6.62 4.73 - 8.67 6.99 
       c. Marginal Efficiency of Capital 0.27 0.58 0.14 0.32 0.16 -4.46 
       d. Debtors / Creditors Ratio 5.37 3.83 5.95 3.02 3.81 6.29 
 
Insofar as the BDCCB is concerned, the mounting NPAs or overdue or bad debt 
during the late nineties period had adversely affected majority of the estimated ratios during 
this period. Not only the permanent capital position of BDCCB was noticed to weaken during 
the late nineties period but its dependency on debt for its finances had also sharply increased 
during this period. The share of net worth in total liability of BDCCB was also noticed to have 
sharply declined during the period between mid-eighties and the late nineties. The declining 
share of net worth had caused an increase in debt asset ratio of BDCCB during this period. 
Added to this, the return on equity of BDCCB had not only drastically fallen but it became 
negative during the late nineties period as against the mid-eighties or the early nineties period. 
The rate of return on asset and marginal efficiency of capital of BDCCB had also shown a 
drastic fall during the period between early- and the late nineties. All these disquieting trends 
clearly indicate non-viable functioning of BDCCB during the more recent times. Further, the 
negative value of return on equity of BDCCB noticed during the late nineties period clearly 
indicates inefficiency of BDCCB in managing its assets and liability, as also its income and 
expenditure patterns. 
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Section II 
Cooperative Bank Finances 
 The trend over the past two decades show a slower growth in institutional finance 
through credit cooperatives during the decade of economic reforms (1991-2000) as against the 
decade preceding it (1980-1990). Not only this, the reform period is also seen to be marked 
with a slower growth in membership of credit cooperatives in Maharashtra (Table 5). On the 
other hand, the outstanding loans of these cooperatives have grown at much faster rate as 
compared to their loan advances during both pre-and post economic reform periods. 
Table 5: Cooperative Bank Finances in Maharashtra; 1980-2000 
                                                                                    (Amount in Crore Rupees) 
Cooperative Banks 
No. of Coop. Inst./Soc. No. of Members (‘000’) Loan Advances Outstanding Loansl 
Period 
A
pe
x 
PA
C
S 
To
ta
l 
A
pe
x 
PA
C
S 
To
ta
l 
A
pe
x 
PA
C
S 
To
ta
l 
A
pe
x 
PA
C
S 
To
ta
l 
TE 1982/83 31 18565 18596 1109 5595 6704 3318 288 3606 1507 431 1938 
TE 1990/91 34 19694 19728 1523 7910 9433 9298 929 10227 4811 1521 6332 
TE 1999/00 34 20378 20412 1340 10432 11772 22195 2280 24475 15274 3456 18730 
CGR (%) 
- 1980-90 
- 1991-00 
- 1980-00 
 
1.33 
- 
0.37 
 
-0.03NS 
0.48 
0.65 
 
-0.03NS 
0.48 
0.65 
 
1.01NS 
-1.91 
1.65 
 
4.90 
3.48 
3.35 
 
4.33 
2.72 
3.15 
 
14.47NS 
7.12 
8.64 
 
13.64 
9.36 
12.93 
 
14.08NS 
9.74 
10.76 
 
23.97NS 
13.52 
14.57 
 
12.59 
9.07 
12.92 
 
18.50 
12.98 
14.64 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Economic Survey of  
              Maharashtra’  
Notes: 1) CGR = Compound Growth Rates 
           2) All growth rates significant at 1 per cent level of probability 
           3) NS: Growth rates not significant at 1 per cent level of probability 
           4) Apex institutions include SCBs and DCCBs 
 
 Another interesting feature of credit cooperatives, particularly of PACS in 
Maharashtra, is the increasing trend in their share of medium and long term (MT &LT) 
advances and decline in their share of short term (ST) advances (Table 6). The trends in 
recovery and outstanding loans of PACS in Maharashtra are also similar to that of their loan 
advances, i.e., a declining share in short term recovery and outstanding loans of PACS in the 
face of an increasing trend in their share of MT and LT recovery and outstanding loans during 
the period between TE 1985 and TE 2000.  This is a pointer to the fact that in more recent 
times medium and long term loans have become the major foci of farm finance. Nonetheless, 
mention may be made here that the PACS in Maharashtra are beset with several deficiencies in 
their functioning. The deficiencies are noticed in respect of their law operational efficiency, 
high incidence of overdue, low level of recovery, distributional aspect of ST and MT loans, 
coverage of SC/ST members, etc. (Shah, 2001). 
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Table 6: Progress of PACS According to Type of Loan Advances, Recover and  
               Outstanding Loans in Maharashtra                                     (Amount in Crores Rupees) 
Loan Advances Recovery Outstanding Loan Period ST MT  LT Total ST MT LT Total ST MT LT Total 
TE 1985 280 
(81.79) 
59 
(17.35) 
3 
(0.86) 
342 255 
(87.75) 
34 
(11.85) 
1 
(0.40) 
290 381 
(72.23) 
140 
(26.53) 
7 
(1.24) 
528 
TE 1990 594 
(72.67) 
185 
(22.63) 
38 
(4.71) 
817 485 
(77.85) 
114 
(18.32) 
24 
(3.83) 
623 739 
(61.97) 
388 
(32.58) 
65 
(5.45) 
1192 
TE 1995 790 
(80.51) 
162 
(16.55) 
29 
(2.94) 
981 656 
(82.51) 
124 
(15.64) 
15 
(1.85) 
795 1074 
(59.18) 
631 
(34.76) 
110 
(6.06) 
1815 
TE 2000 1902 
(76.05) 
543 
(21.69) 
57 
(2.26) 
2502 1567 
(81.37) 
325 
(16.90) 
33 
(1.73) 
1925 2122 
(60.09) 
1219 
(34.52) 
190 
(5.39) 
3531 
Source:  Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Co-operative Movement  
              at a Glance in Maharashtra, Office of the Commissioner for Co-operation & Registrar of Co- 
              operative Societies, Maharashtra State, Pune 
Notes: I) Figures in parentheses are percentages to the total 
           ii) TE: Triennium Ending; ST: Short Term; MT: Medium Term; LT: Long Term 
 The borrowing members per society of PACS are also reported to have come down, 
especially after the late eighties period. Further, despite Maharashtra being accounting for the 
bulk of the nation’s total production and acreage under cotton crop, the share of this crop in 
total crop loan advances of PACS is also reported to have declined perceptibly, especially in 
more recent times (Shah, 2001). Even the statistics reported by Mujumdar (2001) at all-India 
level show a decline in borrowing farmers during the period between 1990-91 and 1995-96. 
However, this statistics is reported for commercial banks. In fact, the lackadaisical approach of 
PACS towards loan advances to SC/ST members and other weaker sections, and also for 
cotton crop calls for immediate remedial measures if Maharashtra is to continue to lead the 
country in the cooperative development. 
Commercial Bank Finances 
As for institutional finance to farming community, the commercial banks in 
Maharashtra have also not shown encouraging trends. The trend over the past two decades 
shows a slower growth in rural institutional finance through commercial banks during the 
decade of economic reforms as against the pre-economic reform period (Table 7). The 
commercial banks in Maharashtra have not only shown slower growth in their loan advances 
and deposits but also decline in their credit-deposit (C-D) ratio during the period of reforms as 
against the pre-economic reform period. However, mention may be made here that though the 
rural C-D ratio of commercial banks in Maharashtra has come down from 72 per cent during 
TE 1982/83 to 65 per cent by the TE 1999/00, it is still well above the minimum prescribed 
limit of 60 per cent as stipulated by the RBI. 
It is to be further noted that in Maharashtra the outstanding loans of indirect finances 
of commercial banks have grown at much faster pace as compared to their outstanding loans of 
direct finances to farmers (Table 8). 
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Table 7: Rural Deposits and Credits of Commercial Banks in Maharashtra 
                                                                                                                    (Amount in Crore Rupees) 
Triennium Ending CGR (%) Indicators 1982/83 1992/93 1999/00 1980-90 1991-2000 1980-2000 
   Rural Deposits 381 1964 5145 19.05 14.40NS 16.28 
   Rural Credits 274 1457 3346 17.08 12.28NS 14.91 
         CD Ratio (%) 71.91 74.18 65.03 - - - 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Economic Survey of  
              Maharashtra’ 
Table 8: Progress of Distribution of Outstanding Advances of Scheduled Commercial Banks  
               to Agriculture in Maharashtra Vis-à-vis India         
              (Amount in Crore Rupees) 
FDFI LEEBEW OTIF@ DFF Total 
Period No. of 
Ac. 
AO No. of 
Ac. 
AO No. of Ac. AO No. of Ac. AO No. of Ac. AO 
Maharashtra 
1980 2649 18 1105 33 83396 90 485350 254 574500 395 (11.05) 
TE 1985 4416 11 5012 69 51141 113 906131 572 966700 765 (10.02) 
TE 1990 2458 16 176 44 20940 105 1548068 1388 1571642 1553 
(10.06) 
TE 1995 4557 24 2454 212 13541 175 1577661 1819 1598212 2230 
(10.10) 
TE 2000 2859 115 9256 386 21879 2241 1217692 3182 1251686 5924 
(14.06) 
India 
1980 36700 206 12010 145 1085002 433 8501469 2789 9635181 3573 
TE 1985 50135 325 38119 392 639520 695 13582102 6220 14955262 7632 
TE 1990 44514 363 54823 484 606412 645 20665098 13950 21370846 15442 
TE 1995 45271 389 69127 923 314821 860 20486449 19916 20915667 22088 
TE 2000 58477 1455 71915 1589 178850 6095 16810610 33001 17119839 42140 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Statistical Tables Relating  
             to  Banks in India, Department of Banking Operations and Development for the RBI, Bombay’  
 
Note: Figures in Parentheses are shares of Maharashtra in India’s total Outstanding Loans 
         @-includes loans to farmers through Primary Credit Societies 
        FDFI: Finance for Distribution of Fertilizer and other Inputs; LSEBEW: Loans to State Electricity  
         Board for Energization of Well, etc.; OTIF: Other Types of Indirect Finance; DFF: Direct  
         Finance to Farmers; AO: Amount Outstanding 
 
Table 8 also shows an increasing trend in share of Maharashtra in total outstanding 
loans of all scheduled commercial banks of India, which has grown from 10 per cent during 
TE 1985 to as high as above 14 per cent by the TE 2000. These trends are certainly not very 
encouraging insofar as the commercial bank finances to farming community in Maharashtra 
are concerned. Despite the recommendations of the R.V. Gupta Committee, appointed in 1997, 
which encompass several changes in commercial bank’s documentation, loan appraisal 
parameters, operational procedures and loan product with built-in liquid saving product, the 
rural credit delivery through commercial banks in Maharashtra has grown at lower pace, 
especially during the 1990s. 
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RRBs 
 Undoubtedly, the major part of resources of RRBs is generated through deposits. 
Nonetheless, too much dependence on deposits and lack of attention paid to loan advances is 
certainly a disturbing phenomenon. In course of time, the RRBs in India have shown a drastic 
fall in their credit-deposit (C-D) ratio. The C-D ratio of RRBs at all-India level has come dawn 
from 123 per cent during 1981 to as low as 43 per cent by the TE 2000 (Table 9). The fall in 
this ratio is more sharp in the state of Maharashtra, which has come dawn from 148 per cent 
during 1981 to 55 per cent by the TE 2000. It is to be noted that in Maharashtra, as on March 
2000, there were 582 branches of RRBs with Marathwada region accounting for around 50 per 
cent share in total numerical strength of these bank branches of RRBs. The decline in C-D 
ratio of RRBs is mainly due to diversion of substantial portion of their resources in 
investments instead of lending in rural areas. It should be recollected here that the chief 
objective of setting up of RRBs was the effective coverage of small and marginal farmers, 
landless labourers, rural artisans, etc. with a view to enhance their productive capabilities. The 
decline in their lending business is a clear cut reflection of deviation of RRBs from the 
objectives they were initially formed. 
Table 9: Progress of Deposit and Credit of Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) in Maharashtra Vis- 
                à-vis India                                                                              (Amount in Lakh Rupees) 
Maharashtra All-India Period Deposit Credit  CD Ratio (%) Deposit Credit  CD Ratio (%) 
1981 557 824 147.94 33147 40682 122.73 
TE 1985 1724 2034 117.40 97075 107492 110.73 
TE 1990 8851 10709 120.99 353554 321839 91.03 
TE 1995 22757 17373 76.34 861931 528835 61.35 
TE 2000 75492 41562 55.05 2685412 1152160 42.90 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Statistical Tables Relating  
             to Banks in India, Department of Banking Operations and Development for the RBI, Bombay’.  
 
 It has been asserted by Shivamaggi (2000) that the major problem faced by RRBs in 
India is the lack of staff motivation and specialization despite local recruitment of their staff. 
The poor performance of RRBs greatly owed it to their hurriedly recruited and trained staff 
that not only lack exposure in dealing with a large number of small-term/ composite loans but 
also in terms their weak knowledge to deal with bank accounts, seek assistance and guidance 
at each stage of loan application to its recovery.  
Land Development Banks 
 In the state of Maharashtra, the loan advances of LDBs have not only declined sharply 
during the period of reform but also working capital of these banks fell marginally during this 
period (Table 10). The membership of LDBs of Maharashtra has also grown at slower rate 
during the period between 1991 and 2000 as against the period between 1981 and 2000. Even 
the recovery of loans and share capital base of LDBs have weakened during the reform period. 
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Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the outstanding loans of LDBs in Maharashtra have grown at 
slower pace during the period between 1991 and 2000 as against the period between 1981 and 
2000 (Table 10). 
Table 10: Progress of Maharashtra State Cooperative Land Development Banks (LDBs) 
                                                                                (Amount in lakh Rupees; Membership in thousands) 
Period Membership Share 
Capital 
Owned 
Funds 
Borrow-
ings 
Working 
Capital 
Loan 
Advances 
Loans 
Recovered 
Loans 
Outstanding 
TE 1985 827 3743 7173 31182 44405 5651 2710 30627 
TE 1990 926 4531 11922 48045 66685 8932 3846 49245 
TE 1995 1111 7184 14766 68076 107311 13668 6089 82328 
TE 2000 1189 9752 54633 109438 144262 4875 8641 99690 
CGR (%) 
- 1981-00 
- 1991-00 
 
2.79* 
1.65* 
 
9.34* 
7.07* 
 
13.18* 
38.61* 
 
9.38* 
8.79* 
 
6.07* 
-0.27 
 
0.54 
-18.53 
 
7.75* 
6.83* 
 
9.21* 
5.64* 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Co-operative Movement at  
             a Glance in Maharashtra, Office of the Commissioner for Co-operation & Registrar of Co- 
             operative Societies, Maharashtra State, Pune 
 
 In order to tackle the problem of overdue of LDBs, certain suggestions have been 
extended by Kumar and Dixit (1998), which mainly revolve around creation of greater 
coordination among ST, MT and LT loans and streamlining the operations of LDBs, checking 
the diversion and misuse of LDB’s credit, effective supervision of loan product, strengthening 
the share capital base, and mobilizing deposits and debentures through more innovative 
deposits and debenture schemes. Another important suggestion in this context is in favour of 
launching intensive membership drive with a view to increase the coverage of these long term 
financial institutions. Some of the agricultural and rural development banks (ARDBs), 
popularly known as LDBs, have already taken initiatives in these directions. 
Conclusions 
An analysis encompassing central level credit cooperatives operating in forward and 
backward districts of Maharashtra also revealed deterioration in their financial health due to 
mounting NPAs or overdues’. It is to be noted that both SDCCB and BDCCB showed a 
decline in their financial health and economic viability during the late nineties as against the 
early nineties period. Nonetheless, this deterioration in financial health witnessed particularly 
during the second half (between TE 1992-93 and TE 1998-99) of the overall period (TE 1986-
87 and TE 1998-99) was found to be more pronounced in the case of BDCCB as not only 
various financial ratios estimated for this bank had declined during this period but majority of 
them were seen to be beset with negative values, especially during the late nineties period. The 
mounting NPAs or overdues’ of BDCCB, noticed during the late nineties period, had grossly 
affected the functioning of this bank. They had not only affected various estimated financial 
ratios but also break-even levels of loan advances and deposits of this bank. Because of 
substantially high NPAs, the fixed expenses of BDCCB had been adversely affected, which in 
turn had grossly affected the break-even levels of loan advances and deposits of this bank, so 
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much so that there had been huge gap between the break-even levels of loan advances and 
deposits and the actual loan advances and deposits.  The deficit between actual and the break-
even levels were so high (about 60 per cent) that it was well-nigh impossible for BDCCB to 
overcome this situation. The mounting NPAs of BDCCB had also affected the profit profile of 
this bank during the late nineties period. The proportions of actual advance and deposits to 
their break-even levels of SDCCB had also come down during the latter half (between TE 
1992-93 and TE 1998-99) as against the former half (between TE 1986-87 and TE 1992-93) of 
the overall period considered. Nonetheless, mention may be made here that there was no 
deficit between actual and break-even levels of loan advances and deposits of SDCCB during 
this period. Thus, while BDCCB had shown gross inefficiency in its functioning during the 
latter half of the overall period, the SDCCB, on the other hand, showed only a general 
deterioration in its financial health during this period. 
One of the recent studies conducted by Shah (2004) has already shown high 
transaction costs and poor repayment performance as the twin root causes of the moribund 
state of rural credit delivery system. With a view to revive the agricultural credit delivery 
system, there is need to adopt innovative approaches like linking of Self-Help Groups (SHGs) 
and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) with mainstream financial institutions. Such 
linkages are reported to have not only reduced transaction costs but also ensured better 
repayment performance (Kshirsagar and Shah, 2002). 
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Financial Health of Credit Cooperatives in Maharashtra: A Case of Sangli and 
Buldana District Central Cooperative Bank  
 
 
Deepak Shah* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 An analysis encompassing two case studies conducted in forward and backward 
regions of Maharashtra (India) has shown deterioration in the financial health of central level 
credit cooperatives (Sangli District Central Cooperative Bank (SDCCB)) in forward region 
and gross inefficiency in their functioning (Buldana District Central Cooperative Bank 
(BDCCB)) in the backward region of the state, due mainly to their mounting NPAs or 
overdues’. Because of substantially high NPAs, the fixed expenses of these institutions have 
been adversely affected, which in turn have grossly affected the break-even levels of loan 
advances and deposits of these credit institutions, so much so that there has been huge gap 
between the break-even levels of loan advances and deposits and the actual loan advances and 
deposits. In the case of BDCCB, the deficit between actual and the break-even levels are so 
high (about 60 per cent) that it will be well-nigh impossible for it to overcome this situation. 
High transaction costs, poor repayment performance, and mounting NPAs are the root causes 
of the moribund state of rural credit delivery through these cooperatives. Further, it is to be 
noted that the estimated trend over the past two decades in Maharashtra shows a slower growth 
in institutional finances through credit cooperatives and also in their membership during the 
decade of economic reforms (1991-2000) as against the decade preceding it (1980-1990). On 
the other hand, the outstanding loans of these cooperatives have grown at much faster rate as 
compared to their loan advances during both pre- and post economic reform periods. The 
slower growth in institutional finance through credit cooperatives during the decade of 1991-
2000 is mainly due to adverse environment created by the financial sector reforms. Due to 
unfavourable policy framework, much of the deposits of the credit cooperatives are going into 
investments, instead of advancing loans to the farming sector. As a result, the C-D ratios of 
these credit cooperatives have been adversely affected.  With a view to revive agricultural 
credit delivery through cooperatives, the need of the hour is to adopt innovative approaches 
like linking of SHGs and NGOs with mainstream financial institutions, including cooperatives. 
Such linkages are reported to have not only reduced transaction costs but also ensured better 
repayment performance. In brief, in order to rejuvenate rural credit delivery system through 
cooperatives, the root problems facing the system, viz., high transaction cost, poor recovery 
performance, and NPAs, need to be tackled with more fiscal jurisprudence reserving 
exemplary punishment for willful defaults, especially by large farmers, and the individual 
cases who have borrowed credit from these institutions. In fact, insofar as rural credit delivery 
through credit cooperatives is concerned, the focus should be on strategies that are required for 
tackling issues such as sustainability and viability, operational efficiency, recovery 
performance, small farmer coverage and balanced sectoral development.  
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